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Freedom is not the ability to do anything I want. But the freedom from Determinism of not having to
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Possible a Tibetian Monk qoute.

Please

Michael

Happy 4th.
 
Posts: 1191 | Location: Overland Park, Ks USA | Registered: 01-12-02Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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Here's a bunch of stuff to mull over:

In the first place, we shall, as I have just suggested, probably have to abandon the idea that human freedom is to be understood as a freedom from determinism or causal explanation. We shall have to abandon the idea that what distinguishes mind from body is the former's immunity from causal explanation. No doubt there are many forms of causal explanation which are not appropriate to the mind, but it does not follow from this that the mind is free from any form of causality at all, or that there are any little pockets of indeterminism. Indeed one of the greatest European philosophers, Baruch Spinoza, actually defined human freedom in terms of determinism: 'that being alone is free', he said, 'which is determined by its own inner necessity'.
Michael McGhee (Dharmachari Vipassi), Freedom Emotion & Mind
lecture delivered in Valencia in 1992, © copyright retained by the author

You see, gentlemen, reason is no more than reason, and it gives fulfillment only to man's reasoning capacity, while desires are a manifestation of the whole of life--I mean the whole of human life, both with its reason and with all its itches and scratches. . . . I quite naturally want to live in order to fulfill my whole capacity for living, and not in order to fulfill my reasoning capacity alone, which is no more than some one-twentieth of my capacity for living.
~ Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, as cited in the text of a lecture prepared by Ian Johnston
http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/dostoevsky.htm

Simply put, there is a point in time, a moment of truth, when "the inner connection between our role, our motivations, and our type and manner of experiencing the world suddenly dawns upon us" ([1936] 1968:47). To be sure, some level of social determinism is real, for sociologists and all those who seek to unravel the puzzles of social life (including the puzzle of knowledge itself). None of us is free to exercise some metaphysical power of will. However, to the extent that one uses the power of reason to gain insight into the sources of such determinism, to that extent a relative freedom from determinism is possible. It follows that this potential for simultaneously comprehending self, the socio-historical context, and the object to be analyzed must be realized (especially by sociologists).

Wow, determinism gets talked about a bunch on this webpage at
http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?FreeWill
Causal connections in natural science are deterministic, but psychoanalytic self-understanding leads to autonomy, or freedom from determinism.
http://instruct.uwo.ca/philosophy/128g-001/freudnotes5.html
quote:
In more recent writings, Nancy has also used the term "freedom" (liberté) to articulate this communal structure. By "freedom," Nancy does not mean either freedom from determinism or political freedom as it is traditionally understood. Rather, he means "ungrounded" or "lacking a determining principle." Thus, a free being is a pure gratuity, a gift that exists, "is there," without a reason for being there. "To be sure, here there is no longer even 'freedom,' as a defined substance. There is, so to speak, only the 'freely' or the 'generously' with which things in general are given and give themselves to be thought about." This freedom is, in turn, intimately connected to the being-in-common of a community. "The community shares freedom's excess. Because this excess consists in nothing other than the fact or gesture of measuring itself against nothing, against the nothing, the community's sharing is itself the common excessive measure of freedom. Thus, it has a common measure, but not in the sense of a given measure to which everything is referred: it is common in the sense that it is the excess of the sharing of existence." The link between freedom, thus understood, and community runs (unsurprising for a student of Derrida's) precisely through signification. Freedom is not a definable characteristic that people possess; instead, it is the inability to reduce people to a defining (set of) characteristic(s), to a signification.
The community, then, is the sharing of that inability to be reduced to a signification, which is the nature...of freedom. In community, an individual's-or, in Nancy's terms, a "singularity's"-freedom is exposed to the freedom of other individuals, and in that mutual exposure exists the relationship that, resisting signification, forms the communal bond. This does not mean that freedom is then the common substance that defines the nature of the community. Freedom is instead the opposite of a common substance; it is precisely the resistance to the kinds of identities of which common substances are made.
~ Todd May


quote:
If, as Kant suggests, we are to understand freedom as freedom from a sensate series of causes, and if morality itself is derived from this autonomy, how plausible is the notion that autonomy and morality consist of causal determinism by immutable laws? It is only in the sense that humans find themselves occupying both worlds that morality takes the shape of imperatives or "oughts". Just as the sensate world's natural laws are descriptive and normative in a causal sense regarding everything wholly within that world, so also are the noumenal world's laws descriptive and normative in a causal sense regarding everything wholly within that world.
If such is the case, what reason would we have for rejecting the conclusion that true morality consists simply in not fighting against the deterministic influences of the descriptive and causally normative laws of the world in which you find yourself? Perhaps Kant believes that the fact rational nature provides the possibility of interrupting this world's otherwise complete power to determine action somehow points to its inherent value above and beyond all other points of reference. But can we not posit the "holy" will residing wholly in the noumenal world as possibly aware of his ability to transgress those "immutable" laws of his world? Would it seem to him a wonderful and noble adventure to achieve entrance into our sensate world in order to succumb to the causality of our natural laws? If "freedom from determinism" is simply an artificial construct through which we imply an exalted activity of moving from one determinism to another simply because we notice that we seem to have "freedom from determinism", in what plausible way might we understand this journey to be in any sense noble?
Kant begins his theory with a rational being with each foot in a different world. The fact that the rational being may do so is due to the presence of a rational nature through which he belongs to and identifies with the noumenal world. But we must also here add that another equally valid reason that this rational being is able to thus straddle two worlds is because he possesses a human nature through which he belongs to and identifies with the sensate world. Given this scenario, Kant needs to justify his assumption that the sensate world is such that its influences need to be viewed as significantly inferior to the influences of the other. He seems to argue that this is evident based on the fact that the sensate world is merely a realm dominated by determinism by efficient causality. But by the time we are given a full picture of the noumenal realm, we find that what makes it noble is precisely what makes the sensate ignoble: causal conformity.
Another similar assumptions which Kant needs to justified is that an apparent sense of self-determinism implies the need for radical allegiance to the noumenal accompanied by repudiation of the sensate. Given the initial picture of the two-world citizen, what precludes us from expecting morality to be derived from a balance or co-dependency of world systems rather than pitting one against the other? Kant again seems to argue that the sensate is clearly inferior due to the sheer fact that it is dominated by efficient causes and that rational beings find themselves to be free from such. And as before, this argument proves to be less than convincing after we see what the noumenal world looks like. And even if we were to discover that one world deserved prominence over the other, it is really the case that we intuitively recognize Kant's noumenal world to be superior to the sensate world?
If mystery or enigma were virtue, no rational being could deny the sheer moral worth of the noumenal world. But this is not the case, and as it stands, we know very little if anything about this world of which we are said to be citizens.
© Scott David Foutz
http://www.quodlibet.net/kant.shtml


For an agent’s actions to be within its control, the agent must be free from determinism (i.e. be able to do otherwise given past events and the laws of nature). However, we should recognize that if an event is undetermined, it will appear to be random or a matter of chance. It makes little sense to assign any responsibility to any agent in such an event. Therefore, it seems in the case of responsibility, what matters is not that a decision was caused, but that it was caused in the proper way. This assertion provides quick refutation to an obvious objection: Computers cannot be moral agents because they simply act in accordance with their programs and are not free. Since freedom from determinism is not needed for the assignment of responsibility, this objection is invalid (Bechtel, 1985 and Dennett, 1984).
~ Can a Computer Be a Moral Agent? by Matthew E. ? at
http://www.mattsbistro.com/academics/agent.doc


"Kind hearts are the gardens; kind thoughts are the roots; kind words are the flowers; kind deeds are the fruits."~English Proverb

[This message was edited by thenostromo on 07-04-04 at 10:57 PM.]
 
Posts: 17415 | Location: Wisconsin | Registered: 06-07-00Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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Thanks Jon,

Good stuff, but I was really look for who said

the quote and it's context. Possibly a Tibetan

Monk.

Michael
 
Posts: 1191 | Location: Overland Park, Ks USA | Registered: 01-12-02Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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"In your hearts you know that true love is a gift from God and respects His plan for the union of man and woman in marriage. Do not be taken in by false values and deceptive slogans, especially about your freedom.... Freedom is not the ability to do anything we want, whenever we want. Rather, freedom is the ability to live responsibly the truth of our relationship with God and with one another."
~ Pope John Paul II
http://www.adoremus.org/399Popevisit.html
http://www.wandererforum.org/publications/focus030.html

Freedom
http://learnv.ycdsb.edu.on.ca/lt/FMMC/hpteacher.nsf/Files/mcmanad/$FILE/freedom.htm

Read this webpage by J. David Hoke
http://www.horizonsnet.org/sermons/rom21.html

St Bernard of Clairvaux, the 12th century Abbot of Clairvaux
quote:
Bernard's belief that true freedom is not the ability to do whatever we want, but freedom from sin and for service to God and neighbour

http://www.ad2000.com.au/articles/2002/nov2002p17_1197.html


"Kind hearts are the gardens; kind thoughts are the roots; kind words are the flowers; kind deeds are the fruits."~English Proverb
 
Posts: 17415 | Location: Wisconsin | Registered: 06-07-00Reply With QuoteReport This Post
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