I spoke the other day of the colossal
military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the
northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was
decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or
sixteen French divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the
British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the
British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern
equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those
weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we consider the heroic
resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses
inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the
thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and best-equipped troops might have
turned the scale. However, General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British
divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades.
They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to
France as fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the
purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot
afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have
had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great
battle instead of only three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which
the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We
have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a small way to our
own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on
the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the
years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for
the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There
are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I
frequently search mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open
a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future.
Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present
Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all
sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of
Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the
House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely
necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall
be respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men,
men who are here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and
faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I
should not think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this
afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear that will be clear
in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that
would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members
will desire to make and for the House to
discuss vital matters without having
everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have
happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed,
I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst
possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in
France would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight
on, '~f necessary for years, if necessary alone." During the last few days we have
successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of
communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the
beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in
this country. Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable
success in their local encounters against the enemy. We have also brought back a great
mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been accumulated in France
during the last nine months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today
a very large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our best-trained and
our finest troops, including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their
quality against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at
the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we have the
Local Defense Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, are
yet armed with rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defense Forces
every man for whom we have a weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the
near future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train
further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed during the vast
business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are
innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they
receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually
landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect
order, with all their artillery and equipment. And these very high-class forces from the
Dominions will now take part in the defense of the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of
these large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take part in the great
battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training and
organizing at home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified
their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number which the French had been led
to expect would be available in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our
forces at home have a fighting value for home defense which will, of course, steadily
increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time
require the transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and
after they had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained with all
the masses of munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as
continuous battle it will surely be.
Here is where we come to the Navy-and
after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must remind
them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned in discussions about the
possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the
Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out
of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because our Territorials had only
just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for several
months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time
in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a
magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of
fighting a general engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple
of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that
the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they
seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini
a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play
the part to which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find
out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the last war or whether they
have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as
sea-borne invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it
today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this
war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now,
the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men
flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or
foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern conditions, depends upon
the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large size, in view of our
military strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something
they can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five
divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air
reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it,
and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to escort it; and there
would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted
long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst
blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying to land. We also have a great
system of minefields, recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the
channels. If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the
task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect
them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.
Those are the regular, well-tested,
well-proved arguments on which we have relied during many years in peace and war. But the
question is whether there are any new methods by which those solid assurances can be
circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty,
whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it
reaches, or at the moment when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for
me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have not
thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange. All I
will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject,
because the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The
House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being
evoked from large numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up
to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance and untiring
searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember,
the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it
that the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army from Germany
into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea
are in no way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the
distance, we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we
did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines. We
could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption which is possible from surface
vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the
invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our superior
naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air
assistance.
This brings me, naturally, to the great
question of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle between the British and
German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of
our land forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force
has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops
and attempted descents of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm
reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to continue
the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course,
it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the
most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful
Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types
of machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have
been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and
lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were
accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one. In
the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the
German Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three
or four to one day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs which were published a
week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled on the beach
and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation
would not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air
superiority at that time and at that place.
In the defense of this Island the
advantages to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the fighting around
Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at
Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which get down
safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in
modern air fighting-all of these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly.
soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their
complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.
During the great battle in France, we
gave very powerful and continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and bombers;
but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan
fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was
also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively
affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the
unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforseen power of the armored
columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air
Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then
we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as it is,
I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present time
relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and
consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the air
under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently
to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will
have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the
most deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the danger of
bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of
the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we
have a very large bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in
Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which
lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up
to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on
in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will depend upon
this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities of their
race, and render the highest service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever
our sphere, our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the
famous lines:
He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.
I have thought it right upon this
occasion to give the House and the country some indication of the solid, practical grounds
upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many
people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to
tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can
assure them that our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we
should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We
have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great
communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our
civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely
devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions
which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully consulted them, and I
have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of
Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful
man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole
panorama of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have
Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because they
represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most moving terms in which
they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes
and to persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.
We may now ask ourselves: In what way has
our position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the
Germans have conquered a large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small
countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and
adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely
increases, the power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into
the war increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak
by that. We do not know whether military resistance will come to an end in France or not,
but should it do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces,
both military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House these
will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent, as no doubt it
has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army in France, have far
larger and more efficient forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic
control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to his
already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we
are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of
all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the
Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy
bombers.
I do not see how any of these factors can
operate to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter will impose a
strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel
heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that
from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for
Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices of
invasion she might conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent
her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a slightly
modified form, during all these m6nths. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously
improved our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the
beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a
sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balancesheet and
contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense
vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years of the last
war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That was our constant
fear: one blow after another, terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried.
And yet at the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of
the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood
everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into which they had broken. During that war we
repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever
to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly,
our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with victory that in our
folly we threw it away.
We do not yet know what will happen in
France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the
French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities
and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their
Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have
read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own
hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to
conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However matters may go in France
or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and in the
British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are
now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage,
and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall
be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we
recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own.
All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of
France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle
depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and
the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the
enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this
Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of
the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole
world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will
sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by
the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so
bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years,
men will still say, "This was their finest hour."
